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May 28, 1986 factors that will affect the cash market
prices during July 1986 will be
reflected in the July 1986 futures
contract prices. It is impossible to
deliver soybeans produced in the fall of
1986 to meet the contractual obligation
of the July 1986 contract.
CHERNOBYL: AN OPPORTUNITY
TO EXPLOIT FUTURES MARKET SPECULATORS
Brian H. Schmiesing
Assistant Professor
Grain Marketing
Agribusiness Management
The recent meltdown" of the Russian
reactor at Chernobyl resulted in a major
improvement in futures market prices.
The emotionality of the futures market
reached a peak when the announcement was
made that a second reactor may have
melted down.
This newsletter examines how a
producer could have implemented a
strategy to exploit the overreaction
that developed in the futures markets.
Although this opportunity has passed,
unusual weather developments or
unexpected circumstances can again
develop to upset the price relationships
between the cash and futures markets.
What might be learned from the Chernobyl
experience?
Prices Used in Analvsis
The movement in soybean futures
contract prices—as a result of
Chernobyl—was dramatic. To study the
soybean price patterns, three basic time
periods must be analyzed: the pre-
meltdown period April 21-25, the
meltdown period of April 28-May 2, and
the post-meltdown period of May 5-9.
The futures market reaction to the
meltdown affected futures contract
prices for both soybeans already in
storage and soybean production that will
become available this fall. The Chicago
Board of Trade July 1986 and November
1986 futures contracts are used in the
analysis.
The July 1986 futures contract is
an "old crop" contract. Actual
deliveries of soybeans at the specified
cash delivery point markets can be made
during July 1986. Therefore, market
The November 1986 futures contract
is a "new" crop contract. Actual cash
grain deliveries to meet specifications
of this futures contract will be in
November 1986. This is the first con-
tract for which 1986 soybean production
is available for delivery.
South Dakota soybean producers must
be concerned with the basis relationship
between the futures contract prices and
their local cash prices. Sioux City
soybean cash prices after the close of
soybean futures contract trading were
used as the daily soybean cash prices in
the analysis.
The Pre-Meltdown: April 21-25
During the week prior to the
meltdown, the soybean futures contracts
were trading in a fairly narrow price
range (Table 1). The highest price for
the July contract was $5.28, while the
lowest price was $5.18. The trading
range for the November contract was
$5.00 to $5.08.
Tabi* l: eriicavb board of Trada Soyboan ru«.uroa Pri.—, bAotta Ciay
Cadb brAoaa* and %ha Saoum City baata for April 21, Ibbb
Throuph Nay b, lbbb*«
bieua
City
Cooh
C^lsa Hifh
July Futuroa
Contraot Prieaa
Cloao baoia Hifh
Pro-Roltdownt April 21*29
April 21 *9.19
22 Cb.lb
23 *9.19
24 99.19
29 •9.1b
•9.22
•9.2b
•9.3b
•9.24
•9.24
•9.21
•9;22
•9.21
•9.22
•9.21 -O.Ob
•9.24 -O.Ob
•9.23 -O.Ob
•9.23 -O.Ob
•9.23 -O.07
•9.04
•9.0b
•9.0b
•9.0b
•9.Ob
Noltdoont April 2b-Nay 2
2b .lb 09.29
9 99.23 99.39
0 99.29 •9.b3
1 99.09 99.90
2 99.12 99.37
•9.21
•9.29
•9.33
•9.33
•9.31
•9.29 -0.07
•9.34 -0.11
•9.91 -0.29
•9.39 -0.2b
•9.34 -0.22
•9.10
•9.30
•9.92
•9.40
•9.24
Poat-Noltdoun: Nay 9-9
9 99.19 99.3b
b 99.17 99.39
7 99.17 99.39
• 99.21 99.94
9 99.29 99.44
•9.34
•9.31
•9.31
•9.37
•9.37
•9.3b -0.19
•9.3b -0.19
•9.33 -0.1b
•9.39 -o.ia
•9.42 -O.IT
•9.24
•9.2b
•9.3b
•9.93
•9.44
- Futuroa
Contract Fricoa
Cioao baoia
•9.00 99.04
•9.02 Ob.Ob
•9.09 99.07
•9.09 99.07
•9.Ob •9.0b
•9.04 99.10
•9.12 ^9.22
•9.23 99.41
•9.22 99.24
•9.17 99.lb
•9.21 99.29
•9.19 99.27
•9.21 99.23
•9.30 99.3b
•9.34 99.40
0.11
O.Ob
O.Ob
O.Ob
O.Ob
0.06
0.01
•0.16
•0.19
•0.06
•0.06
-0.10
-O.Ob
•0.17
•0.19
by Ray 23 the July baaia had narrewad te - b canta and Nowaabar'aaala"
• 12 eanta. Tha eloainp prieaa for tha July and Nowaaaar eontracta
ra 99.33 and 99.19. raapaetivaly. Tha Sieua City eaah prica waa 99.27.
Cash soybean prices and the basis
were also stable. The Sioux City cash
soybean price after the futures market
close ranged between $5.15 and $5.16 for
the week. The July hasis--the cash
market price minus the closing futures
contract price—ranged between - 6
cents and - 8 cents.
The Meltdown: April 26-Mav 2
The Russians indicated that diffi
culties with Reactor began on Satur
day, April 26 at 1:23 AM. Actual know
ledge of a potential meltdown by other
nations did not occur until Monday,
April 28, when Swedish monitoring de
vices detected increased radioactivity.
On that Monday, the futures contracts
continued to trade in a range similar to
that of the previous week.
On Tuesday, April 29, however, the
futures markets began to climb rapidly.
The rumors of the meltdown and its
potential damage on Soviet agriculture
circulated in the media and at the
futures exchanges. The closing July
futures contract price increased 9 cents
over the Monday close, while the
November futures contract closed 12
cents higher.
However, cash prices increased only
5 cents, to $5.23, at Sioux City.
Because the futures contract prices had
strengthened relative to the cash price,
the July basis had widened to - 11
cents.
During Wednesday morning, April 30,
the futures markets surged to much
higher levels. A rumor had begun
circulating that a second reactor had
experienced a meltdown. This fueled the
market to a high of $5.63 for the July
contract and $5.52 for the November
contract. But by early afternoon, the
existence of the second meltdown was
being questioned. Also, preliminary
estimates indicated that perhaps only a
small percentage of the Russian crop
would be damaged. By the close of
Wednesday's trading session the futures
"'^^ket prices had fallen from their
daily highs but were still above the
previous day's close. The July and
November contracts closed at $5.51 and
$5.A1, respectively.
Wednesday's cash price only
increased 2 cents over Tuesday's price.
The July basis had widened from a - 7
cents to - 26 cents between Monday and
Wednesday. The cash market was not
participating fully in the rally.
The Hesitant Cash Market
The futures market rally resulted
in farmers selling soybeans to local
elevators. This marketing activity
depressed the rally in the cash and
futures markets. Why?
When an elevator purchases soybeans
from a farmer, the elevator will
frequently hedge the purchase on the
futures market. When an elevator hedges
purchased soybeans, it sells futures
contracts. If farmers market a larger
bushel voliane of soybeans, the elevators
will sell a larger volume of futures
contracts to hedge. This hedging
activity will put downward price
pressure on futures contract prices.
Also, because of uncertainty about
the market direction of the following
day, elevators would be "taking protec
tion" in their cash bids. Elevators
lower their cash bid to protect
themselves against decreases in cash and
futures soybean prices in a volatile
market.
If grain exporters had been selling
an increased volume of soybeans to the
Russians or other countries during the
rally, the exporters would have been
bidding for grain in the cash and
futures markets. Instead, we saw the
cash price weaken relative to the
futures market.
By Thursday, May 1, the rally
faltered as more detailed information
became available about the actual situa
tion. The closing July futures price
dropped 16 cents and the November con
tract price dropped 17 cents. The cash
price followed the futures prices down
ward and was 16 cents lower on Thursday.
On Friday, May 2, the futures
^o'^tracts were trading in a narrower
range as the market became more certain
of the meltdown's "lack" of implications
for soybean prices. The large potential
carryover of soybeans once again came to
dominate market outlook.
Even though the futures prices had
dropped, Friday's cash price improved 3
cents over the previous day. The basis
was beginning to narrow as the elevators
became more confident that the market
had begun to stablizie at a new price
level.
The Post-Meltdown; May 5-9
During the following week, the
futures contracts again reflected a
rather stable trading range. A partial
exception occurred during Friday when
Western European countries began to take
actions to protect their food supplies
from contamination by imported products
from Eastern Europe and Russia.
The trading range was.- in the
$5.30's for the July contract and
$5.20's for the November contract. The
November contract prices were closer to
the July futures contract prices. The
impact of the meltdown was being
reflected more heavily in the "new" crop
price than the "old" crop price. The
expectation was not for a short~run
surge in product demand.
Cash Marketine Strateeies
Producers that depend on cash
markets to establish prices for their
soybeans would have gained little from
the Chernobyl reactor meltdown. Cash
prices increased over the pre-meltdown
week low-by 10 cents, while closing July
futures prices increased 30 cents and
closing November futures prices
increased 37 cents.
Clearly the, major price movement
was in the FUTURES market--not in the
CASH market. Exclusive dependence upon
cash marketing would have precluded
producers from taking advantage of a
marketing opportunity.
An Old Crop Hedge
In hedging, producers must have a
good knowledge of the basis. On April 30
and May 1 the July basis had widened
significantly. Was this basis wide
enough to justify hedging rather than
simply selling old crop soybeans in the
cash market? One strategy is to look at
the basis for previous years.
South Dakota producers must market
their soybeans to cash markets that are
not delivery points for the futures
contracts. The cash and futures
contract prices converge at the futures
contract delivery points during a
delivery month. However, local supply
and demand conditions will be different
between Sioux City and the future market
delivery points. Because of these
differences. South Dakota producers are
confronted with a more uncertain basis.
The producer would hedge the old
crop soybeans with July futures contract
and the new crop soybeans with the
November futures contract. Assume the
producer hedging old crop soybeans felt
that the basis might not return to a
normal" level until the week just prior
to the July delivery month. For the
producer hedging new crop soybeans, the
planned cash delivery date was also the
week prior to the November delivery
month. For the July basis, the last 5
trading days in June and for the
November basis the last 5 trading days
in October are presented in Table 2.
Cicy •oykMA Sesie in Cwif Pwr Bushel <er tiie Lesx fiu
Deye ^&er te the Beliwerr ••hth <ev iBBl-lsea.
Trstfinf Deye Brier te Deliverr neeth
JULY ruTont eomser
I9Bi
19B2
IMS
IVM
IMS
i.iS>
1.19)
• 19)
.1*1
cro.19)
cro.ao)
<«0.20>
<«o.ia>
(hO.QB)
<•0.19)
<•0.19)
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1944 (40.12) (40.12) (40.14)
1949. (40.29) (40.29) (40.29)
(40.41)
(40.29)
(40.22)
.19)
(40.41)
(40.24)
(40.22)
.12)
(40.20) (40.29)
for the
five Dsye
(40.12)
<40.14)
(40.17)
(40.14)
(40.09)
(40.42)
(40.22)
(40.27)
(40.14)
(40.24)
During the Chenobyl meldown rally,
April 30 and May 1, the July basis
widened significantly to -26 cents.
Based on the historical bases for 1981-
1985 our expectation would be for the
basis to narrow between 6 to 20 cents by
the July delivery month. Given the
narrow basis prior to the incident, the
basis would be expected to narrow by 10
cents or more. This is exactly what
happened.
A producer that wanted to sell
"old" crop soybeans would have been
better off to hedge on the futures
market. After the basis returned to a
more normal" spread, the producer would
hedge to sell the soybeans in
the cash market.
For example, during the post-
meltdown week, the basis had narrowed to
16 cents. Because the cash market
became stronger relative to the futures
market, a producer would have gained 10
cents a bushel on the basis movement.
89Z <D ON lINUad
vQsn
aiVd sa3d 9 3DVlS0d
31VU xins
After the.post-meltdown week, the
basis continued to narrow. On May 23,
the July basis was - 6 cents. A old
crop hedge would have returned 20 cents
per bushel because of the narrowing
basis.
New Crop Hedge
When attempting to hedge new crop
soybeans, producers must realize the
November basis is much more unstable.
The November basis ranged between - 68
cents and - 13 cents during 5 trading
days prior to the delivery month (Table
2). Producers should talk to., a number
of elevator managers about what they
expect the basis will be this fall, and
analyze the forward contract bids
offered by the elevator.
Assume the producer made a decision
to obtain a price above the loan rate
for soybeans for part of the 1986
production. Assume the elevator
managers indicated expectations of a
November basis of - 30 cents. Previous
to the meltdown the producer, commodity
broker and lender entered into a three-
way agreement to insure that an adequate
line of credit would be available to
meet margin calls. The producer places
with the broker a sell-limit order of
$S.A9 for the November 1986 contract.
patsanbay uoipajJOQ ssajppv
j94fa|SMaf4 sojuiouosg
00E$ 3sn aiBAuj joi A;iBuad
ss3Nisna ivioiddo
ZOOZS as 's5u!>|00jg
AjjSjaAiun B;o>iBa njnos
ajOiinouBv ;uaujyBdaa -gTl
aofAjas uojsua^xg aAj^BjadooQ
The sell-limit order implies that the
broker must sell the futures contract at
$5.49 or higher. Adjusted for the
expected basis of -30 cents, this would
imply a cash price of $5.19 before
commissions.
The advantage of such an approach
is the producer establishes a price
objective and then can concentrate on
the farming operation. By having a
standing order placed with the broker,
the producer increases the chance that
his/her price objective will be
achieved. The futures contract has to
only trade briefly at the established
order price for the order to be filled.
This prevents the producer from
suffering from the "I missed it"
syndrome,
Using the Speculator
In the Chernobyl incident, the
speculation in the futures markets
resulted in an abnormally large basis
during the price rally. By using a
basis hedge, the producer could have
sold an "overvalued" futures contract to
a speculator. By having the objective
of pricing the product after the market
returned to a more normal basis
relationship, a producer could have been
able to increase the net price received.
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